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\
Lewis Livingstqn
Flortda: Pyrrhic Def~at.
To "STRAIGHTS" LIKE US th~ beginning was bizarre. There we were, five
obviously establishment types, all scrubped a~d necktied: confronted
by a hir~ute, sandaled trio who appeared not to have go~ten the word
about being clean for Gene. What brought us together; was summed
up in the stark poster which decorated the apartment where we met. It
was the now famous caricature of LBJ a~tride a moto!cjycle with the
- word "BULL" tatoobd on his fingers. What brought usl together was
hopb for an alternative to "BULL."
.
.
'~Actually, I'm for Dick Gregory," said the le~der of-th(l visiti g New
Le ists, "but McCarthy seems the least insane of all the nest." n that
no the Children's Crusade, Sunshine Edition, opened. It cli axed a
1
'
. ' ,
.7
litt e more than two! months later on May 2S, the day of lorida s
De' ocratic primary, !with a victory celebrationf victory because we had
onl lost.our county ~y a mere 700 votes after ~uckingthe sta e pr~ss,
the Florida Democra~ic establishment, and North Florida's k ee-jerk
conservative voters. '
Early on election night I joked that if I were ever to wjrite anything
about the campaign it would be titled something like "How To Win
An Election While Losing Your Wife, Job, and Academic Standing."
Fortunately the last three things did not happen; unfoJtunately the
first .•,did not either. As a political scientist com,.mitted to~ what Heinz
Eul1u has called "The Behavioral Persuasion,!' I should be 'expected
to rli:nder order, out of the chaoS' of the campaign by onducting a
clinical evaluation. My. own moral involvem~t, howevCfr, precludes
the intellectual distance necessary for that kin~ of study. [Neither can
. I report on The Big Picture, McCarthy's Strategy in Flori~a. The links
of our county organization, and Ii·· suspect tme links o~ most rural
c;punty organizations, were far too tenuous for i.US to have p~rticipated
in grand strategy. What follows here, then,. jrepresents a hopefully
balanced recollection, a string of anecdotes ~nd impressions of the
campaign from the viewpoint of a graduate ~tudent wh e~ded up
. being county co-chairman for McCarthy in FIOlrida.
Jon Shaughnessy came to Gainesvillet the seat of the niversity of

Published by UNM Digital Repository, 1968

!

1

!

i

.

!

'

r

II

\

New Mexico Quarterly, Vol. 38 [1968], Iss. 2, Art. 15
90

tI

( ,

,

LEWIS LNINGSTON
:

Florida, w;th a co~ple of friends from Sarasota's Ne)v College, a title~
State Stu~ent Coordinator for McCarthy, and a name or two of some \
people w~o might be sympathetic. The name or two provided a few,
more' names ,and we met at the apartment in the scene described
earlier. S~ughnessy' s visit was welt-timed. It was between academic
terms. The chaff of the student body was at Daytona Beach, Fort
Lauderdale, the Bahamas. The wave of elation which had followed
Mc~arthy's primary victory in New Hampshire h,ad leveled to anticipation of Wisconsin. Most of us did not even know that Florida was
gomg to have a presidential primary, much less,that McCarthy or any
national candidate would enter it. We had been 'aware for months
that Florida's lam~ duck Senator George Smathers ,plann~d to lead a
delegation which would go down the line at the cqnvention for LBJ
and The War. But if primary history, was any clu9' Smathers would
have no opposition.
' '
Shaughnessy's disclosuie to us that McCarthy w<j>uld campaign for
the Florida delegation was,as the ad says, "A Breath of Fresh Air:' We
already believed in what McCarthy' was trying to d~. As Shaughnessy
, .explained the structure of.the Florida primar;, to us, we began to believe
McCarthyhad a chance, if not to win, at least to spoil Smathers' hopes
for a sweep'. (Although all of us present from the University of Florida
were grad~ate students in political science, only one of US had any
knowledge of Florida electoral politics; his knowledge, came from ex. perience in sweaty public combat, not from study.) We recognized that
jit would not be easy: Florid.a had changed drastically since the days
when it elected New Deal 'Populist. Claude Pepper to the U. S. Senate
in 1938. Still, we reasoned, a groundswell of disgust at the war, ~t the
Johnson style, and at the imIflobilisme of Amerkan politics was grow," ing. It could 'be tapped for McCarthy. Furthermore, on the local level
we knew that the faculty at the university were aghast the growing
prospect ot training students only to ha,:e them sent to .the Vietnam
charnel house. The professors, we hoped, would proVIde a modest
financial base for the local campaign. So we got in, telling ourselves it
was not a Quixotic gesture, but that we had the only chance available
in the South to register a meaningful protest against the one-way direction of America's roller CGaster policy at home and abroad.
Assuming from the first that we were alone on the campus and in the
county, we began recruitment. Such an assumption was not unwarranted: the atomization and apathy of the student body and a towngown relationship that is more chasm than schism prompted us to pro-
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ceed as if we were the only McCarthy group arqund. WI:: ere unaware
that the Florida Conference of• Concerned DeJjnocrats
ha I established
;
a local nucleus around P,rofessor Emeritus Geprge Fox, ~ former cultural attache at the U. S. Embassy in Rome \\jho was thoroughly disgusted with perpetuation of worn-out Cold-,War policies by the U.S.
After emerging in January with an enthusiasti¢ rally for S~nator McCarthy in Miami, Concerned Democrats moved during the next two
1 months to organize a slate of 61 delegates.
.
, Like most liberal movements in Florida, Con~ned Democrats ,was
centered in Miami. The slate was led by Allap Milledge~ a youtlJful
lawyer unknown in Florida politics. Gainesville was repre,sented on the
slate by two professors' wives (one of whom happened to be the cochainmin of the county Democratic Executive jCommittee). and by a
retired management consultant who recently hatllost a bid for elect,ion .
to the city commission. Th~ delegates, Dr. For, and a few other academes were the Gainesville McCarthy for President organimtion at· the time the student group was forming. It wa~ not altogether inevitable that the two groups get together, in vie)v d,f the peculiar way university friendships have of"being isolated ac'cor~ing to academic discipline. We sort of bumped into each other during the word-of-mouth recruitment phase, quite unaware of each other's existence till then, and
we agreed to have lunch together. .
.
that
there
was
a
"town"
prganizati~JIl,
visions
of
With thek'nowledge
campaign war chests provided by affluent me~chants apd professors
appeared before us, along with visions of mass rallies with local political
bigshots speaking for :McCarthy, etc. That was before lunch. Then we
learned that the town organization;like ours, consisted of an extended
friendship n~twork. In the few days since Shaughnessy's visi~, however,
we had amassed a list of about fifty students'and ~. few faculty who were
ready to work for McCarthy. \Ve scheduled a nleeting on campus and
many of them came.
Our immediate problem was to avoid conflict with sUIPporters of
Robert Kennedy. As the end ot .March approached and the dleadline for
filing in the primary neared, most young Kennl:1dyites were ,convinced
that the McCarthy slate would be the rallying point for t~e anti-war
'liberal vote in Florida. \0\1e had been assured by our own stat~ organization that Kennedy was not planning to enter the Florida p~imilrY. To .
.have done so would have meant disaster for hilmself and ~1cCarthy,
llnsid_ering the electoral impotence. of Florida hberals. .NerertheI~ss,
w~ Were confronted at our first meetmg by Kennedy supporters' claIms
.
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that the New York Senator would in fact enter the Florida primary. As
Frank Zambito, a fellow political science student, p~t it, the session
degenerated into a debate "over how many liberals can stand on a
Florida palmetto." The McCarthyites were cqnvinced that there was
room' for only one. For the time being the Kennedy supporters ac·
quiesced. So we passed out the few bumper strips, buttons, and propa·
ganda we had and made plans' to blitz the campus. A sympathetic book
seller had let us set up a booth in .front of his store where hundreds of
students were buying books for the opening term. \In three days we
amassed lists of about 500 names of prospective volun'teers and gathered
in nickel and dime donations totaling more than $100.
Normally shy, Zambito could have given lessons to Lyndon on arm
twisting as he conducted running debates and cajoled twenty-five cent
donations or commitments to lick envelopes from prospective workers.
We had expected some student support but not of the depth and scope'
which we received in those days. The "rah" fraternity and sorority types
were signing up, not only because this year involvement was "in:' but
because they recognized in the McCarthy campaign an absence of
those elements in adult society so well synthesized in the popular song
of the day, "Hello Mrs. Robinson." There were earnest hippies, patheti.
\cally offering to stay out of sight but demanding a chance to work for
il\kCarthy. A graduate student, seeing our puny poster above the booth,
walked in a bee line across the busiest street in Gainesville, oblivious to
traffic. Pulling up in front of us, he said, "I have to write a dissertation
this term. Gimme a button." Then he parted with a $20 donation from
his fellowship.
.
In those days we were operating more or less out of my briefcase and
using as a base the telephone of a Johnson-supporting but fair~minded
professor. A group of medical students had taken over a mim<:ograph
somewhere in the labyrinth of the J. Hillis Miller Health Center. They
ran off our press releases, letters, and so on. The future physicians were
aa anomaly: they were in one of the most conservative states, and repre·
senting the most conservative profession; yet they seethed with McCarthy sentiment. Several students spent ldng hours tracking down a
sympathetic realtor. who permitted us the use, rent-free, of a vacant
store. as headquarters for the campaign. Common to the medical school
group as well as to others whO'were joining the cause. was a revulsion to
the Johnson style, a disgust with the war, and a hope that somehow the
seemingly tired American political system could be made to function
responsively.
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..At the start, none of us, who were responsible for
things were.
really convinced of the a~age that campaign v9lunteers must be put. to
work immediately. Of our original band, the lone membch with political experience.had slipped into the backgroulitd-he too ~as writing a
di,sserhition. Since the rest of us did not really know what"fe were going
to do next, how could we effectively assign tasks to volunte~rs? We took
do.wn names, addr~~ses, Ski.lls, then t:old v.~lu!Ilteers wJ would be "in
touch" sooor \Vhen we did manage to get 'in: touch, Jlohnson had removed himself from the race and, like a festeri~g thorn, had taken with
him the source of student disco.ntent. Our b~ttalion of five hundred
was reduced to a'dedicated company of about qne hundred. That, however, was for the future. For the present we were about to get our first
less,on in Realpolitik from the KeI?nedyites.
It is safe to say that, before we had been recruited to work for McCarthy, many Glf us would have gone either way-to McCarthy or
Kennedy, deperlBing on who got to us first. Most of us who knew any'thing about Flo~da's voters felt that McC~rthv would have more success because he was nQt perceived as a radical.:Kennedy, although engaging at the time in one of his cyclic shifts to the center, nevertheless
was shackled with the ~'outside agit~tor:' image of his Attorney General
days-at least in Florida. Nevertheless, had both men !entered the
Florida primary, it would have cleft the embryonic lib~ral ,community
and guaranteed a victory for Smathers, a victorY which 'Jollmson could
have intlrpre~ed as a mandate. After the first few days of or~nizing, our
small group had invested that quantum of ti~e and emQtion which
transforms the fence sitter into the true believer: Thus we \'-iere shocked
and angered when the campus newspaper trumpeted hintjs that Ken- ,
nedy would come to the university in a ~days. Irnplicit.'tas the indication that a Kennedy slate would enter the primary.
.
A series of negotiations with Kennedy's student group g<\lt nowhere.
"Our group is growing geometrically," said one of them. iVe learned
later that this meant they had four the day before and sixteen the next.
Sandy D'AIemberte, a young state legisla"tor and, like Milledge, a IvIiami
lawyer, was leader of the Kennedy forces in Florida. He a9d the rvfcearthy leadershi~ c?uld not get togeth.er. At t¥e urging ~f ,our Miami
office and at the mSlstence of our towmes, we !{ook no achon. ~Iahy of
the wavering McCahhy troops had beert demanding a mer~r: the two
candidates seemed so close on issues and together were so far from
Johnson. If they clashed in Florida it wou,ld mean the end of any chance

o
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for the South to utter a protest; for Florida was the only Southern state
with a primary.
With nothing resolved we spent the weekend grimly anticipating the
promised Kennedy Rally. The money was there, turned on at a spigot in
Washington: in contrast,to our treasury of widow's mites. Thelcampus
was smothered with posters, the most expensive rock group iJ,1 town was
hired, radio time was purchased by the hour. We had fears of our
grbwing army being charmed away by the form rather than the substance of a Kennedy happening. The rally was scheduled for April!. On
that day, too, were to appear our own newspaper ads announcing the
.opening of our headquarters. In a masterstroke of bad juqgrnent I sug...~gested we call it, in the ads at least, a "dump Johnson" headq\,larters to
rally all elements. Naturally the ads were placed before the weekend.
Most Americans must have dozed as their President plowed through·
his prose that last night of Marc}l. Then suddenly he became A Great
American and quit. Our ads the next day looked silly. But the rally of
our nascent opposition suffered more. In~tead of the late Senator, there ,
was a taped long distance phone call from Ted Sorenson. The call had .
Ibeen recorded about an hour before Johnson'S abdication the night
before. Needless to say, it was less than timely. We pressed on. It soon
was clear McOarthy was to be the only national candidate on the
Florid~ pri\nary ballot. This meant a battle solely with the state's
Democratic party establisbment, tough enough, but at least the liberalS
were not rent by a IV1cCarthy-Kennedy conflict.
In Florida there is little outside a few urban areas that resembles
machine politics. Only in such places as Miami and Tampa does the
party form ipto those coalitions of labor, ethnic groups, and liberal intellectuals which characterize Democratic politics elsewhere. -Instead
counties. Congressional districts, or cities, are ruled (in medieval style
by the prevailing laird-be he sheriff, Congressman, commissioner or, in
one case, bank president. The Smathers slate included them all. They
were smug. They had no need to campaign. An in(ormal network of
tax assessors, court clerks, peace justices, and spoils system public employees would quietly put out the word to the regulars. If past primaries
were any indication, Florida votet~ just did not seeII\ to care about participating in the presidential nominating process. This perhaps stems
from the kind of paternalistic care the party establishment h~s taken in
the past two elections to see that there is no confusion brought by the
prcseace of more than one slate on the ballot. This year, however, in
addition to the McCarthy slate and the Smathers favorite-son slate,
"
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t~ere was a joker in the pack: twice defeated gubernatorial candidate
and Democratic maverick Scott Kelly had filed an ideologically mixed
, bag of. delegates who were identified on" the primary ballot as the "No
Preference" slate. This meant they h~d no unit preference as to who
was the nominee. These were the choic~s fot Florida Democrats.
Like the three slates, the Florida that confronted the slates was
loaded with contradictions. At one time it had been considered Oljle of the le~st conservative of Southern states. Since World War II, there
has .been a massive influ~ of retirees, industrial farmers, and midd1e
income business families attracted chiefly by the aerospace boom. Extremism flowered and along with it a conserva.t.ive mood which tolerated tight extremism while condemning direct action fIDr civil rights.
There were pright spots, nonetheless. Daytona Beach elected a Negro
city commissioner a few years earlier. But a few'blocks away lives Rev.
Wayne Pouchet, the former syrupy salesman'qf t1?e radical right on
H. 1. Hunt's "Lifeline." The state's intransigent judiciary provide,d
Gideon vs. Wainwright-, a test case which resulted in the U.S. Supreme
Court's extending the right of counsel to thepoof. Yet it was the first
Southern state to convict a white man of.first-degree murder for killing
a Negro. In Sarasota there is a vicious dial-a-hate operatiop. There isalso New College, which is earning a reputation as one of the most
innovativ~ institutions' of higher learning in the country. In the 1964
presidential election Florida was the sixth most conservative state, giving Johnson a bare 51 %. And we thought McCarthy had a chance in
the primary.
.
'We hoped that.voter apathy might work for us in a slightly different
way than the party regulars planned. By mobilizil'lg voters ,who go into
the booth but normally do no.t bother to press the· presidential preference lever we thought ,we could spoil Smathers' p,lans. Another reason
for optimism was in the structure 0,£ the primary',s delega~e apportionment. Florida gives 37 at-large delegates to toe statewide winner.
Another 24 delegates are chosen within Congressional districts, two
, from each. Smathers might be deprived of delegates from the Miami
and Tampa areas. In addition, there was the ~prawling Sc::cond Congressional District which included both the University; of Florida in Gainesville at one end and Florida State University in TaHahassee at the other.
If a Children's Crusade ,could be mounted to effect in Flmidait ought
to be here. Unfortunately the growing conservatism of Florida is intensHied in that 2,-county district. Whereas all but one of the "counties
voted Democratic in 1960, in 1964 with Barry Goldwate~ calling for the

I:
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wagons to be drawn in a circle and for the U.S. to "lob one into th
men's room pf the Kremljn," sixteen of tho~e couD$ies hearkened an
defected to Republican ranks. The average drop i\t the Democrati
presidential vote that year in the district was 21 %. Our strategy had t
beta concentrate on the two urban areas, Tallahassee and Gainesville,
and consider, any rural votes as money from home.
Following our modest but enthusiastic headquarters opening with a
town meeting, tht! McCarthy for President Committee was formed by
combining the student and town groups. The lone townie who attended
the meeting was Chester B. Chance, a young lawyer. Because he was
the' only non-university person, he was elected co-chairman.. I was
chosen as the other co-chairman, primarily because I happened to be
. one of the few students present who had a car. Later our steering com. mittee grew to include a number of professional people from the comt munity, but at the start it was an all-university show. The addition to
the 'steering committee of a -merchant, doctor, or school teacher-anyone not associated with the university-was ,cause for a press release
which said in eff~ct: "See, we aren't all eggheads!"
From the start, however, it was apparent that academia was pverrepresented and that two disciplines dominated the committee. Among
the'students the leaders consisted largely of political science and history
graduate students, with the former slightly heavier in representation.
Among the professors it was the reverse but still political science an.d
history. There are some obvious reasons for this: historians and political
scientists presumably have more familiarity with the arcane vocabulary
of politics and, because, of their professional interests, are used to sorti~g out the ~otsam ape jetsam in the daily waves of political informa·
tion with which thJ media flood the electorate. In the case of the
political science students I suspect there was a suppressed desire to hop
in and do hand, to hand combat with the microbes of politics after
watching their behavior under a microscope for so long. There were
others involved too, of course: a biochemist and his wife who earned
their political spurs with the California Democratic Clubs; a pediatri.
cian whose political heroes were Herbert Lehman and Franklin
Roosevelt (a fact not guaranteed to make him widely popular with his
professional coHeagues); a Negro laundry owner-operator; an eI}gineer.
ing professor whose wife and the Senator's wife,Abigail, were girlhood!
friends; the wife of a graduate student w!th su~h cqmmitment she put
her youngster in a nursery for the duration of the campaign so she could
supervise the canvassing effort.

D'I
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From our tiny treasury we purchased' voter rolls for a couple of pre- .
dncts and began pho~ing Democrats. The pU11pose of this was to
identify Democrats wh<;J either were undecided or mildly C!:ommitted to
supporting McCarthy. Because of lohr limited manpower we wrote off
the rest. If a voter showed interest he received apacket of propaganda a
few days later. Our mail bill, $3 a day, was enormous compared to our
resources. The phone canvass also provided a read[ing on Florida voter
apathy. Nearly three quarters of those contacted, said tliley were undecided as close as a month before the election. This hel<il up through
the hause-to-house canvass and in the finafphone e.ffort on election eve
and election day. From the results it appears that the decision for most
voters was made as they drew the curtain behind them in ~he booth or
not at all. Only 62 % of the D'emocrats who voted in the primary voted
in the presidential contest. Why should they both~r? Florida's Democratic party elite had been..making decisions for the, rank and file for so
. long it was a hard habitto break.
The people who were trying to break the habit were a unique lot.
Gainesville liberals andt I suspect, their counterparts throughout the '
I South try to mak~ up in ubi(~uity what they lack in nUE·bers. This.
means that the same faces could be seen around the tables t civil rights
meetings, school bond issues committees, progressive ch rch groups
(there are some), and campaign committees for candidate~of a ~iberal
persuasion. It means that in the last week of the PFimary~ampaign, a
steering committee member :was so busy addreSSing.. himse f to several
other c~itical issues in letters to the editor that he nege1e ted to send
one for McCarthy. It means that conviction overruled t e practical
considerations of seeking votes in a racist white electoratie so that a
delegate was arrested (and duly identified as a McCarthy de1eg~te in '
the press) in a civil rights demonstration. In l:\n absurd example, it
means that one worker's sense of public duty to view,te1evilion's Public
Broadcast Laboratory (so it will get good ratings) ~verrod!e a duty to
attend'Sunday campaign meetings. The ultimatejeffect of aU tlrts is that
the "enemy" has an easy time because its consfituency takes cues on
~sues according to the cast of surrounding, characters. Candidate A
may b~ an unknown but if Mrs. X is publicly working for him it will be
known that he supportsissue~ 1,2, and 3 and opposes 4 and 5. This is
not to say that frequently Southern liberals do not engage in the same
kind of shorthand identification. But given the assumed differences in
sophistication between the liberal and conservative constituencies,dhis
cue-takiFlg appears to have a deleterious effect, on the progressives.

I

~
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Another effect was financial.. Gainesville's liberals had! beeh bled by so
many causes and caJildidates earlier in the year that, although they 'were.
as deeply committed to the McCarthy campaign as to any other, their'
resources were drained.
Midway through the two-month campaign there was a statewide
meeting in Orlando. Nancy Adams, the attractive executive secretary
of the state campaign committee, crisply and efficiently told countY
leaders where they were supposed to be in terms of campaign phases.
Coffers should have been overflowing with donations from McCarthy
teas' and cocktail parties. Thetdoor-to-door canvass should have been
underway, and' a complete file should have been developed on all
re~istered Dem~crats from the telephone survey. And so on. If the
county reports that followed Miss Adams' breakdown were any indication, McCarthy should have carried the state. All were of course over·
optimist,ic, prol)ably because we were all new to Florida politics. Never·
theless some great. news came out of the Orlando meeting: Senator
McCarthy would campaign in Florida. He planned to swing down the
slate for two days shortly after the Nebraska primary. A Democratic
presidential candidate 6f national stature had not campaigned for dele·
gates in Florida in twelve years..
"
The first hint of how the campaign was to be treated by the press
came in the' way the announcement was played down-page iC was
'about av~rage.· Although the Gainesville paper die¥- frontpage the
story, it was the exception. Even when McCarthy Itoured Florida,
drawing sizable crowds, the stories were played insid~. Televisipn reporters focused on the isolated hippies in the crowds. iNewspapermen
noted in every story that much of tIle crowds were umder 21 years of
age. The.press was chiming in with the Democratic establishment of
Florida.
'
Besides not taking the McCarthy campaign seriously in its news
columns the papers argued in their editoria~s that Smatlilers' slate would
"make the best deal" for Florida at the national convention. Even the
progressive St. Petersburg Times shoved aside its obvious doubts about
Vietnam and its antipathy for Smathers to urge suppbit for Florida's
Finest. The Times noted that this was the slate of Claude Pepper and
Sam Gibbons, the state's lonely nberaJs in the Congressional delegation. On the right, The Orlando Sentinel reminded its,readers that the
Smathers slate included Haydon Burns, Florida's ex-gOVernor, and Don
Fuqua, North Florida Congressman, both arch-consdvatives. Among
the state's major dailies, only dovish John Knight, Rublisher of the
I
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Miami Herald, declined to e1?,smathers. Presumably :he might
have
supported McCarthy
but
•
.
.

their disagreement
on II domestic
.
'
I Competing for national atte tion with Oregon's primary, which fell
on the same day, and with California's, which came a week later, the
Florida' campaign was lost in the news. Despite the canvassing effort,
McCarthy's visit to the state, and such news as local organizations
. could make on their own, many voters probably remained unaware that
they would have a chance ,to participate in' the nominatiIllg procesS'
, themselves instead of simply giving a proxy to the politicians. In Florida
as elsewhere McCarthy paid a further penalty for what one observer
has called "operating outside the constraints of'the old politics." When
the crusade bega.n in December, the press refused to take it'seriously.
Then came the victories in New Hampshire and \Visconsin, and Johnspn's abdication-a direct result of the McCarthy campaign. Yet the
press was committed to its prediction. With the exception' of al fewl
independent columnists, the press scrambled to make its prophecy selffulfilling. The victories were hollow, the malaise in the:political system
only transitory, said the papers. Amazingly, however, McCarthy senti- .
ment grew in the polls.
'
Roberto Ibarguen, a history graduate student, was our chairman for.
the northeast Florida boondocks. At county party ralll~s in the scrub
counfry he and a handful of students passed out literature. Frequently
one of our band went along to speak for McCarthy. Invarial1ly on returning to Gainesville, Roberto would remark on the polite lack l of •
interest with which he,had been reGeived: "It's Wallace Country." On
electionday, however, some 7,274 rural voters in our area pulled the
McCarthy lever. They did it with little or no prompting firom our .
organization and with precious little exposure to the qImpaign in the
F10rida media. As the returns came in on May 28 a cheer went up at
headquarters as the McCarthy slate carri~d Micanopy. This ris a tiny
farm community about fifteen miles south of Gainesvil~. It is even bypassed by the major north-south highWay of central Flcprida, U.S. 441.
Micanopy's sole claim to sophistication is a modest Cebter of Modern
Art. Net .McCarthy drew 64 votes there against 48 for Sm.athers and 15
for Kelly's maverick slate. No one had been ringing doorbel,ls for
McCarthy; no rallies had been staged (0 mobilize Mi~anopmns~ Yet
somehow the message got through'.
•
Where the message did not get through was in the ghetto. Although
Negro voting registration in Gainesville is notoriously, low despite a
~sues.
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black populati.on of about 25%, we had to rule out any rrgistration drive
because of time and manpower limitations. Our plan. was to canvass
Negroes just as we canvassed elsewhere, relying. on oUr't, lephone survey
first, then following up with house calls. On electioQ day we, would
attempt a house-to-house shotgun effort in the hard;core ghetto. In
middleclass Negro sections canvassers were well received. In the ghetto,
however, where there are few registered voters to begin with, apathy was
stunning. S!nce telephones are scarcer there, we reasoned that many
potential voters for McCarthy were not identified because we had not
reached them by the phone canvass. We hoped to find tpem on election
day when we w~nt indiscriminately from house to house. Some professionally done minority group campaign literature had finally arrived
a f~w days before the primary. We thoughti it could be used Ito good
effect in the ghetto. While our election day callback to McCarthy supporters w~s gding on, as many of us as Were available, I think about
thirty or so, went into the ghetto. The shock came with ,the returns.
Although McCarthy carried one Negro precinct, he lost in ~nother,
hurt chiefly by a light vote in the presidential race. The response of a
fiftyish man with whopl I unsuccessfully pleaded to come to the polls
;.vas typical: The bulk of his small disability check-his sole source of
income-went for rent of his neat but dilapidated home. He 'said, "1
voted for Roosevelt. I voted for Truman. I voted for Stevenson and for
Kennedy and· for Johnsan. I voted for them all. They all said they
were going to do something for us, but it didn't do no gool I ain't
voting no more."
It also is probable that a runoff for the Senatorial nomination be·
tween former Governor Leroy Collins and state Attorney General Earl
Faircloth hurt. Campaigning on "law and order," Faircloth struck a
chord among lower-middleclass voters. In- one p~ecinct of that income
group there was a 96% turnout for the Senate race, with Faircloth
topping the liperal Collins by two to one. While the presidential race,
drew only ~ 66% turnout, the vote also went two to one in'favor of
Smathers o~er McCarthy. '
:
The statiewide returns in Florida show we took a stomping. The
Smathers stalking horse sla~ got just $hort of half the tota~ vqte. Mc·
Carthy, holwever, did manage to pick up four delegates f~P3 South
'Florida, th~s preventing a Smathers sweep. Unlike other pri ,aries in I
which a ca,rnbined anti-establishment vote might be interpre ed as a I
mandate fqr change, this was not th~.case in, Florida. The McCarthy
slate polled close to '29% and the maverick Ke~ly slate got! abo~t 25%,

.
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denying Smathers a majority. But the meaning of Kelly's votes is unclear.By his own admission, Kelly's slate includes supportdrf of Johnson, Humphrey, Kennedy, and George Wallace. Thus the Kelly vote,
though probably a protest of sorts, cannot be married ideologically to
McCarthy's. Still the McCarthy campaign in Florida cannot The written
off as a defeat.
.
One dimension of the New Politic;; is involvemen~, and in that
sense the campaign was a success, even in Florida. B~side$· drawing
yqung Floridians into political work, the campaign may'well ~ave been
the force which caused a greater percentage of Florida Derno~rats who
went to the polls to participate in the presidential nominatiob than at
any time in the past twelve years. Compared to the t<?tal number of .
Democrats who voted in the primaries of 1956, 1960, and 1964, the
presidential vote was consistently low. Even a primary battl~: between
Estes Kefauver and Adlai Stevenson in 1956 elicited a vote from only
53% of the turnout. With Smathers heading a favorit~ son 'slate unopposed.in 1960 and Johnson's. slate unopposed in 1964, the presidential primary vote dropped to 34 and 35% of the tmjnbut.. But the
presidential vote of 1968 rose to 63% of the most hotly contested race,
the Faircloth-Collins contest.'
.
Without more data and a more thorough analysis it is impossible to
infer from this that the McCarthy grass roots campaign was solely. responsib~e. Other factors also were at work. For the first tiple, tllle gubernatorial race did not coincide with the presidential contest, Florida .
having shifted its governor's race to non-presidential years after 1964; In
addition, the nascence of the Republican Party in Flo:rida'may have
caused voting Democrats to participate more widely in the nominating
process. Furthennore such g:ross data as those cited above tend to be
somewhat unreliable because they deal with aggregates rather than with
the people who compose them. Despite all of this it may be well that
the change in voting was brought about'by,the presence ofa c:andidate
w~ose campaign from the outset has been ba~ed on returning to the
people control ?f th~ political sys.tem. PoJitical paternalism iIll. Florida
m~y have receIved Its most tellmg assault yet from the MlcCarthy
C3mfaign.
'
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